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Insight Assets, Inc., 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-v-
Homero Farias, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
Reply Brief of Appellant/ Cross- Appellee 
S T A T E M E N T OF ISSUE O N C R O S S - A P P E A L 
POINT I. Should the Court reverse the trial court's decision to deny Farias attorney 
fees where Farias was not a party to the Phalen Trust Deed and no other statute exists to 
provide for recovery of attorney fees for Farias? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND ISSUE PRESERVATION 
A R G U M E N T 
POINT I. Farias' analysis is incorrect about the interplay between Utah's Record-
ing Act, the purchase money doctrine, and the bona fide purchaser doc-
trine. 
A. Utah's Recording Act is not controlling in this case because the Phalens and 
FFFC had notice of each other's Trust Deeds. 
As argued in Insight's opening brief, Utah's Recording Act does not apply where 
deeds are executed simultaneously and the vendor and third-party financer have notice 
of each other. Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-102(3) states, "[t]his section does not affect the va-
r v I r^ / Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
lidity of a document with respect to the parties to the document and all other persons 
who have notice of the document." 
Because the Phalens and FFFC had notice of each other's trust deeds, the recording 
act defers to the purchase money mortgage doctrine. 
And the Court should consider the persuasive authority the Colorado Supreme 
Court offers in its ALH Holding v. Telluride opinion discussed in Insight's opening brief. 
In that case, the Colorado Supreme Court analyzed Colorado's recording statute which 
is nearly identical to Utah's. In the ALH case, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the 
recording act was not a bar to a purchase money mortgage claim as argued by the party 
in Farias' position here. 
In ALH the Colorado Court held, 
Although the Bank's deed of trust was recorded before that of ALH, the Bank was 
not entitled to the benefits of the recording statute because it had notice of ALH's 
unrecorded instrument prior to acquiring rights of its own in the property. Further-
more, in the absence of a statutory determination of the relative priorities of the two 
deeds of trust, or any agreement of the parties resolving the matter, the deed of trust 
of ALH, the vendor, has priority over the deed of trust of the Bank concerning the 
same real property.1 
Farias concedes that their recording act argument defers, but does so only in a foot-
note and a parenthetical. Farias states, "[our argument] is partially correct, inasmuch as 
there is a "notice" aspect to priority under Utah's recording statute as well2...[and] as-
suming they have no actual knowledge that the priority of interest in property is other 
than as reflected in the order of their recordings."3 
1
 ALH Holding Co. v. Bank of Telluride, 18 P.3d 742 (2000). 
2
 Brief of Appellee at 17. * 
3
 Id. at 18. 
~ 2 ~ 
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Farias' last statement is incorrect however. The recording act defers to the purchase 
money mortgage (PMM) doctrine in this case because Phalen and FFFC had notice of 
each other's trust deeds only, as is required by the statute. The recording act does not 
require the parties to agree on the meaning of the documents — else lawsuits would 
never occur. 
B. The bona fide purchaser doctrine is a common law doctrine. The Utah Legis-
lature has codified part of the doctrine—unrecorded interests —but not that 
portion of the doctrine applicable here. Therefore, T arias' bona fide purchaser 
argument is only an affirmative defense, not a bar to Insight's vendor PMM 
claim. 
Farias argues that the BFP defense is codified completely in Utah Code. That is incor-
rect. Utah Code Ann. §57-3-103 states that unrecorded interests are not enforceable 
against subsequent purchasers who take the property in good faith for value. 
In this case, Phalen's —and therefore Insight's —interest was recorded as the Phalen 
Trust Deed. As eloquently articulated by the Colorado Supreme Court, 
[w]here a security agreement, or mortgage, is executed between a purchaser and a 
vendor as part of the same transaction in which the purchaser acquires title to the 
property, execution of the deed and mortgage are considered simultaneous acts. As 
a matter of law, such a purchaser never has an unencumbered title to property in 
which he can assign further rights. Therefore, even a third party who loans money to 
the purchaser that is applied to the purchase, and who takes back a mortgage on the 
purchased property, cannot acquire rights to the property from the purchaser unen-
cumbered by the vendor's mortgage, regardless of the order in which the documents 
are signed.4 
4
 ALH Holding Co. v. Bank ofTelluride, 18 P.3d 742, 745 (internal citations and quotations 
omitted). 
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The ALH analysis correctly holds that the vendor's trust deed is necessarily first because 
the vendor never gives free title to the property without the trust deed encumbrance. 
Accordingly, FFFC trust deed was never unencumbered by or superior to the Phalen 
Trust Deed because the Phalen deed was a vendor purchase money mortgage that en-
cumbered the property at the moment the property was conveyed to the Boecks, re-
gardless of the order the deeds were recorded. 
Because the Phalen deed was recorded, Utah Code 57-3-103 is inapplicable to this 
case, and not a bar to Insight's vendor PMM claim. And Farias' BFP affirmative defense 
fails, as demonstrated further herein, and the Court should vacate the trial court deci-
sion for that reason alone. 
C. The priority between vendor PMMs and third party PMMs is not determined 
by the recording act, it is a function of common law. 
Farias incorrectly states, "A different issue is presented where there are competing pur-
chase money mortgages given in the same transaction, such as a vendor purchase mon-
ey mortgage and a third-party purchase money mortgage. The priority given to either 
mortgage depends on the operation of the recording act/'5 This is an incorrect statement of 
the law. 
The priority between third parties and vendors who hold trust deeds executed as 
part of the same transaction is determined by the common law doctrine regarding ven-
dor purchase money mortgages. That doctrine holds that vendors take a superior posi-
tion to third parties as a matter of law because the vendor is parting with both his 
5
 Brief of Appellee at 21 (emphasis added). 
~ ^ ~ 
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money and his property, whereas the third party is only parting with its money, and of-
ten are in the business of lending money to homebuyers — as was First Franklin Finan-
cial here.6 
POINT II. Wells Fargo's laches defense is expressly barred by the contract at issue 
and Utah law. 
A. Under Utah law, Farias' claim of laches is prohibited. 
Farias points to Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Hon. Denise P. 
Lindberg for the proposition that this case is also barred by laches. Yet Farias creates a 
faulty syllogism. In FDLS, the plaintiffs petitioned for an extraordinary writ under Utah 
R. Civ. P. 65B to challenge trust modifications.7 A petition for extraordinary writ has no 
statute of limitations; therefore Utah Supreme Court used laches do bar the plaintiffs 
claims.8 
Yet here, the defense of laches is disfavored in mortgage foreclosure proceedings be-
cause of Utah's six-year statute of limitations on obligations in writing. In F.M.A. Fin. 
Corp. v. Build, Inc., the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
the defense of laches [is of no] avail to the defendant. [Utah Code], which pro-
vides for a six year statute of limitations on obligations in writing is applicable to 
the promissory note and to the mortgage. It had two years yet to run when this 
action was commenced. Even though the foreclosure action is equitable in na-
ture, it is the practically invariable rule that laches cannot be a defense before the 
statutory limitation has expired.9 
6
 See Kemp and Stoker. 
7
 Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ ofLatter-Day Saints v. Hon. Denise P. Lindberg, 2010 
UT 51, f 26, (August 27,2010). 
8
 Id. at f 43. 
9
 F.M.A. Fin. Corp. v. Build, Inc., 404 P.2d 670, 673 (Utah 1965). 
- 5 -
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This case is vastly different from FLDS and Farias fails to provide any relevant law 
that overcomes the Utah Supreme Court's mandate. Here, laches is inapplicable. 
B. The Vendor Trust Deed Note specifically and expressly bars Farias' claim of 
laches/waiver. 
The Vendor Trust Deed reads in relevant part, 
"The failure on the part of Beneficiary to promptly enforce any right hereunder 
shall not operate as a waiver of such right and the waiver by Beneficiary of any 
default shall not constitute a waiver of any other or subsequent default/'10 
The contract language is prima facie evidence that Farias' laches claim fails. In consid-
eration for extension of financing, Phalen agreed that failure of the Boecks to assert it 
claims upon default would not constitute waiver. 
POINT III. The trial court did not err in denying Farias attorney fees. 
A. Based on the promissory note, the Boecks still owes Insight Assets mon-
ey. Insight was the prevailing party. 
Farias argues that the Court must reverse the trial court's decision denying attorney fees 
and direct the trial court to make an award of attorney fees. Yet it cannot. 
While the trial court held that Insight's claim was barred by the BFP defense, it did 
not—and cannot—hold that the Boecks have satisfied their debt to Insight. And the 
Court must remember that while this case presented a novel theory of recovery, the un-
derlying facts are common: A mortgager is attempting to recover debt from a bad mort-
gage. That is what precipitated this lawsuit. 
10
 R. 404. 
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Insight initiated an in rem foreclosure of the Property. It never claimed that Farias 
owed a debt; merely that the foreclosure did not extinguish Insight's trust deed. 
Yet the Court cannot ignore the Boecks debt. Utah law prevents that. Under Russell 
v. Hank, the Utah Supreme Court held that a mortgagor need not pray for a deficiency 
judgment.11 Therefore, because the Boecks defaulted on Insight's obligation, Insight is 
entitled to a deficiency judgment against the Boecks and Insight is the prevailing party 
in this action. Accordingly, as a prevailing party, attorney fees should be awarded to In-
sight under the contract, not against it. 
B. Because Insight could only recover against the property, Fairas was nev-
er on an uneven playing field and therefore attorney fees are inappropri-
ate. 
Farias states that the analysis must focus on whether an uneven playing field regarding 
attorney fees exists between the parties. However, the heart of that analysis is the risk of 
contractual liability for attorney fees. 
In this case, had the trial court enforced Insight's in rem foreclosure action, Insight 
would have been entitled sell the Property and retain only what the Boecks owed. Un-
der Utah Code, all surplus funds are given to the person entitled to them.12 And all un-
derage would be converted to a deficiency judgment against the Boecks —as must be 
done now. 
No circumstances exist where Farias would have to pay Insight out-of-pocket. This 
is the point of in rem proceedings; foreclosures are prosecuted against property, not 
11
 Russell v. Hank, 34 P. 245 (Utah 1893). 
12
 Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-904. 
^ y j r-~i 
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people or entities. To award attorney fees would be to endorse a system of loser pays; a 
punitive system. 
In Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth Corp, the Utah Supreme Court explained "an unequal 
exposure to the risk of contractual liability for attorney fees" contemplates an award of 
attorney fees against one defaulting party but not against the other party if it defaults.13 
But here, Insight never defaulted on its obligations under the note and deed. The Boecks 
got the money and FFFC got the house; only Joseph Phalen—and Insight as the Assign-
ee—is left without. 
Moreover, when a plaintiff prevails on some of its claims brought under a common 
core of facts, it is entitled to compensation for all attorney fees reasonably incurred in 
the litigation as the prevailing party.14 Utah law prevents the Court from awarding at-
torney fees to another litigant —a nonparty to the contract and defendant —where the 
claimant to the contract actually prevails under the contract.15 
Here, the contract contemplates attorney fees to Insight for its efforts to collect on 
the debt owed by the Boecks. One of its methods of collection was to foreclose on the 
property. Where Farias' defense is not founded on any facts or law arising out of the 
contract, it cannot recover attorney fees pursuant to that contract. Meaning, Farias did 
not claim that the contract did not allow Insight to foreclose on the property, rather it 
argued common law prevents its foreclosure. Accordingly, Farias' claim for attorney 
13
 Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth Corp., 2009 UT 2, f f 73-77, 201 P.3d 966. 
14
 Ellsworth Paulsen Constr. Co. v. 51-SPR, LLC, 2006 UT App 353, f f 45-47,144 P.3d 261. 
15
 See generally, Doctors' Co. v. Drezga, 2009 UT 60, f 32 ("As a general rule, Utah courts 
award attorney fees only to a prevailing party when such action is permitted by either 
statute or contract.")(emphasis added). 
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fees does not spring from the contract, and Utah law forbids the award of attorney fees 
unless its pursuant to a contract or statute.16 
The Court cannot justify its award of attorney fees—where Insight met all of its obli-
gations under all of its contracts —without demonstrating they are punitive. 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, Insight asks the Court to vacate the trial court's decision, reverse and re-
mand for findings that Insight is entitled to judgment on its in rem foreclosure because 
Farias is not a bona fide purchaser and the vendor purchase money mortgage doctrine 
prioritizes the Phalen Trust Deed such that it still encumbers the property. Moreover, 
Insight is entitled to its attorney fees on appeal under the terms of the Phalen Trust 
Deed and Note.17 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on this 16th day of February, 2012. 
LAW OFFICES OF 
KELLY ANN yS9 BOOTH 
PLLC 
KellffrnftiBooth 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE of SERVICE 
16 Id. 
17
 R. 000001 at Exhibit B & C. 
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This is to certify that on the 16th day of February, 2012, two true and correct copies of 
the foregoing were served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the follow-
ing: 
Rodger Burge 
Counsel for Farias 
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RULES 
U T A H RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 56 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-
claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 
days from the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary 
judgment by the adverse party, move for summary judgment upon all or any part 
thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim 
is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move for summary 
judgment as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be 
in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the af-
fidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, 
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although 
there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is 
not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, 
the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence 
before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material 
facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and 
in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that 
appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of 
damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings 
in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing 
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would 
be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent 
to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts 
thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The 
court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers 
to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon 
the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as 
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a 
party failing to file such a response. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party 
opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit 
facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application 
for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or dep-
ositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this 
rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party presenting them to pay to the other party the amount of 
the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused, including reasona-
ble attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of 
contempt. 
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STATUTES 
TITLE 38 PROPERTY- REAL AND PERSONAL 
CHAPTER 35 CONVEYANCING AND RECORDING 
SECTION 109 INSTRUMENT MAY BE RECORDED- VALIDITY OF UNRECORDED 
INSTRUMENTS- LIABILITY FOR FRAUDULENT DOCUMENTS. 
COLORADO REVISED STATUTES § 38-35-109(1) 
(1) All deeds, powers of attorney, agreements, or other instruments in writing 
conveying, encumbering, or affecting the title to real property, certificates, and 
certified copies of orders, judgments, and decrees of courts of record may be rec-
orded in the office of the county clerk and recorder of the county where such real 
property is situated; except that all instruments conveying the title of real proper-
ty to the state or a political subdivision shall be recorded pursuant to section 38-
35-109.5. No such unrecorded instrument or document shall be valid against any 
person with any kind of rights in or to such real property who first records and 
those holding rights under such person, except between the parties thereto and 
against those having notice thereof prior to acquisition of such rights. This is a 
race-notice recording statute. In all cases where by law an instrument may be 
filed in the office of a county clerk and recorder, the filing thereof in such office 
shall be equivalent to the recording thereof, and the recording thereof in the of-
fice of such county clerk and recorder shall be equivalent to the filing thereof. 
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TITLE 57 PROPERTY- REAL ESTATE 
CHAPTER 1 CONVEYANCES 
SECTION 33.1 RECONVEYANCE OF A TRUST DEED - ERRONEOUS RECONVEYANCE 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-33.1(1)(a) 
(1) (a) When an obligation secured by a trust deed has been satisfied, the trustee 
shall, upon written request by the beneficiary, reconvey the trust property. 
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TITLE 57 PROPERTY- REAL ESTATE 
CHAPTER 3 RECORDING OF DOCUMENTS 
SECTION 103 EFFECT OF FAILURE TO RECORD 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-103. 
Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void as against any subse-
quent purchaser of the same real property, or any portion of it, if: 
(1) the subsequent purchaser purchased the property in good faith and for a 
valuable consideration; and 
(2) the subsequent purchaser's document is first duly recorded. 
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TITLE 57 PROPERTY- REAL ESTATE 
CHAPTER 3 RECORDING OF DOCUMENTS 
SECTION 102 RECORD IMPARTS NOTICE- CHANGE IN INTEREST RATE- NOTICE OF 
UNNAMED INTERESTS- CONVEYANCE BY GRANTEE 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-102(1). 
(1) Each document executed, acknowledged, and certified, in the manner pre-
scribed by this title, each original document or certified copy of a document 
complying with Section 57-4a-3, whether or not acknowledged, each copy of a 
notice of location complying with Section 40-1-4, and each financing statement 
complying with Section 70A-9a-502, whether or not acknowledged shall, from 
the time of recording with the appropriate county recorder, impart notice to all 
persons of their contents. 
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TITLE 70 A UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
CHAPTER 9A UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE- SECURED TRANSACTIONS 
SECTION 103 PURCHASE MONEY SECURITY INTEREST- APPLICATION OF PAYMENTS-
B U R D E N OF ESTABLISHING 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-103. 
(1) In this section: 
(a) "purchase-money collateral" means goods or software that secures a purchase-
money obligation incurred with respect to that collateral; and 
(b) "purchase-money obligation" means an obligation of an obligor incurred as all or 
part of the price of the collateral or for value given to enable the debtor to acquire rights 
in or the use of the collateral if the value is in fact so used. 
(2) A security interest in goods is a purchase-money security interest: 
(a) to the extent that the goods are purchase-money collateral with respect to that se-
curity interest; 
(b) if the security interest is in inventory that is or was purchase-money collateral, al-
so to the extent that the security interest secures a purchase-money obligation incurred 
with respect to other inventory in which the secured party holds or held a purchase-
money security interest; and 
(c) also to the extent that the security interest secures a purchase-money obligation 
incurred with respect to software in which the secured party holds or held a purchase-
money security interest. 
(3) A security interest in software is a purchase-money security interest to the extent 
that the security interest also secures a purchase-money obligation incurred with re-
spect to goods in which the secured party holds or held a purchase-money security in-
terest if: 
(a) the debtor acquired its interest in the software in an integrated transaction in 
which it acquired an interest in the goods; and 
(b) the debtor acquired its interest in the software for the principal purpose of using 
the software in the goods. 
(4) The security interest of a consignor in goods that are the subject of a consignment 
is a purchase-money security interest in inventory. 
(5) In a transaction other than a consumer-goods transaction, if the extent to which a 
security interest is a purchase-money security interest depends on the application of a 
payment to a particular obligation, the payment must be applied: 
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(a) in accordance with any reasonable method of application to which the parties 
agree; 
(b) in the absence of the parties' agreement to a reasonable method, in accordance 
with any intention of the obligor manifested at or before the time of payment; or 
(c) in the absence of an agreement to a reasonable method and a timely manifestation 
of the obligor's intention, in the following order: 
(i) to obligations that are not secured; and 
(ii) if more than one obligation is secured, to obligations secured by purchase-money 
security interests in the order in which those obligations were incurred. 
(6) In a transaction other than a consumer-goods transaction, a purchase-money se-
curity interest does not lose its status as such, even if: 
(a) the purchase-money collateral also secures an obligation that is not a purchase-
money obligation; 
(b) collateral that is not purchase-money collateral also secures the purchase-money 
obligation; or 
(c) the purchase-money obligation has been renewed, refinanced, consolidated, or re-
structured. 
(7) In a transaction other than a consumer-goods transaction, a secured party claim-
ing a purchase-money security interest has the burden of establishing the extent to 
which the security interest is a purchase-money security interest. 
(8) The limitation of the rules in Subsections (5), (6), and (7) to transactions other than 
consumer-goods transactions is intended to leave to the court the determination of the 
proper rules in consumer-goods transactions. The court may not infer from that limita-
tion the nature of the proper rule in consumer-goods transactions and may continue to 
apply established approaches. 
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ADDENDUM B 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
